LEFT Lab PhD student Tasnuva Tithi was the lead author of this study, which included collaborators at Virginia Tech and the University of Arizona. The paper appeared in the Transactions' May 2018 issue. This article is an example of our work on threat detection for cyberphysical security.
#^Analysis of Friendly Jamming for Secure Location Verification of Vehicles for Intelligent Highways - IEEE Journals & MagazineAbstract:
In this paper, we present friendly jamming for secure location verification of vehicles in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). In friendly jamming confidential information is obscured from eavesdroppers through the use of opportunistic jamming on the part of the parties engaged in communication. Secure location verification enables the infrastructure in an ITS to verify the position claims of a vehicle in an adversarial setting. We present a method for effectively using friendly jamming and distance bounding together to verify the location and velocity of vehicles, and detect any deviation of claims by a “prover” vehicle that is trying to prove its position and velocity to the infrastructure. The technique can be used to verify velocity and position claim of a vehicle, while keeping the feasible velocity and position lie by an attacker in a negligible range. Our analysis shows that in realistic traffic, friendly jamming is an improvement over comparable work, reducing position falsification by 86.66% to 92% for a typical attacker. The proposed technique also outperforms existing localization techniques for multiple colluding attackers, providing security against up to three colluding attackers, where colluders coordinate their movement and report information to help a single attacker achieve its goal.
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